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New evidence suggests that the human visual system incorporates
a high-level, functionally specialised system for monitoring animals.
Such a mechanism may have evolved to direct attention differentially to
ancestrally important categories of objects, regardless of their current
relevance.Geraint Rees
The ability to detect change in the
visual environment is fundamental
for human survival. Although in
contemporary urban environments
the most serious immediate risk
to human health arises from
inanimate cars and sports utility
vehicles [1], throughout much of
human history it would have been
imperative for our ancestors to
monitor animate objects — both
human and non-human animals.
Both predators and prey took
many different forms, and their
proximity would be signaled by
visual change. Under such
circumstances the ability to
monitor for, and rapidly detect,
animate objects would confer
a survival advantage. In a recent
paper, New et al. [2] report
evidence consistent with just
such an adaptation in humans.
In their study, New et al. [2] were
able to show that human observers
are faster and more accurate at
detecting change in animals than
they are at detecting change in
a variety of inanimate objects,
ranging from plants and vehicles
to buildings and tools. To measure
change detection, they used the
classic ‘flicker’ paradigm [3], in
which an original and modified
scene alternate repeatedly,
separated by a brief blank display,
until observers find the change
(Figure 1). The observers eventually
found most changes, but they
could take a very long time to
do so, even for large changes, an
impairment known as ‘change
blindness’ [4].
The authors assessed change
detection using target objects
drawn from five semantic
categories, located within colour
photographs of natural complex
scenes. Changes to animals and
people were detected more oftenand more quickly than changes
to inanimate objects. Importantly,
the advantage of animate over
inanimate objects was present
even for the fastest detections,
and inanimate objects were also
associated with a greater rate of
‘change blindness’, where
a change was missed entirely.
Animate objects were rated as
more salient or ‘interesting’ by
observers, raising the possibility
that factors other than animacy
might account for the findings,
but their detection advantage
persisted when salience was
accounted for. This is consistent
with a role for animacy over and
above salience in explaining the
advantage that animate objects
enjoy in change monitoring,
although the confounding of
salience and animacy makes
this conclusion not entirely
secure.
Before concluding that this
animate monitoring bias reflects an
innate feature of the human visual
system, two important potential
confounds must be considered:
the potential role of low-leveldifferences in the images in change
detection, and the possibility of
expertise in detecting particular
categories of object. Objects
from different categories look
different because they vary in the
combination of low-level visual
features from which they are made.
For example, inanimate objects
are frequently distinguished from
animate by the presence of straight
edges versus curved edges,
respectively. But New et al. [2]
showed that inverting the
photographs used as stimuli
(or blurring them) eliminated the
animate monitoring bias. Inversion
preserves lower-level stimulus
properties but makes identifying
the semantic category that a
target object belongs to more
difficult.
Alternatively, the animacy
advantage for change detection
might reflect particular expertise
acquired by humans during
development. Expertise can
certainly affect change detection.
For example, experts at American
football are better than novices at
spotting changes in football
scenes [5]; and drug users are more
likely than non-drug users to detect
changes to drug paraphernalia [6].
It is of course difficult to assess
an individual’s level of expertise
with people and animals in general.
To circumvent this problem, New
et al. [2] used a control category
that experimental subjects from
California are undoubtedly highly
familiar with — motor vehicles.Figure 1. Change detection
paradigm.
A typical natural scene from
Siesta Key, Florida, into
which a change has been
artificially introduced. Re-
peatedly alternating real
and modified photographs
but with a gray screen inter-
posed between successive
photographs leads to great
difficulty in detecting the
change that is obvious from
inspecting the two static
photographs. This inability
to detect change is known
as ‘change blindness’.
Example dynamic demon-
strations of similar ‘change blindness’ movies can be found at the laboratory websites
of Professor Daniel J. Simons (http://viscog.beckman.uiuc.edu/djs_lab/demos.html)
and Ronald A. Rensink (http://www.psych.ubc.ca/wrensink/flicker/download/).
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R41They found a change detection
advantage for vehicles over other
inanimate objects, consistent with
an effect of expertise with this
particular category; but critically
there was no particular change
detection advantage for vehicles
over animals; and change
detection performance for
humans and non-human animals
was equivalent. The authors
argue that this is inconsistent
with an expertise effect, as
contemporary humans encounter
other humans (and vehicles) far
more often than non-human
animals.
The neural basis of such an
animate monitoring bias remains
unclear. Although much of the
human visual system can operate
on information from many different
domains, reflecting the fact that
people can recognise a large
number of different objects, some
aspects of visual recognition
appear to reflect the existence
of content-specific, functionally
specialised systems. For
example, facial identity and facial
expressions of emotion appear to
be recognised in a content-specific
fashion and are associated with
activity in particular regions of
visual cortex [7,8]. But there is little
evidence for regions in visual
cortex that are strongly selective
for animate or inanimate kinds
generally [9]. The mapping
between the psychological
processes reflecting the animate
monitoring bias and the
underlying neural processes is
therefore likely to be complex,
as for other potentially heritable
mental traits such as human kin
detection [10].
More generally, visual change
detection in the ‘flicker’ paradigm
is associated with activation not
only of visual cortices but also
areas of prefrontal and parietal
cortex [11], consistent with the
proposal that attention plays
a major role in change detection [3].
Indeed, New et al. [2] suggest
that selective deployment of
category-specific attention
underpins the animacy monitoring
bias. Here some caution is
required, as although attention
may be necessary for change
detection it is not sufficient. For
example, even directing attentionto a person centrally placed in
a visual scene is not sufficient to
prevent change blindness [12].
Moreover, judgments of whether
a scene contains an animal or
not can proceed successfully in
the near absence of directed
(top-down) attention [13]. Thus,
although differential allocation of
attention may play an important
role in animacy monitoring, it is
not necessarily the only
mechanism associated with the
change detection advantage;
nor do the findings clearly
differentiate between top-down
and bottom-up mechanisms of
attentional capture.
Regardless of their precise
neural basis, these new findings
are consistent with the existence
of mechanisms in the human brain
that direct attention differentially
to objects by virtue of their
membership in ancestrally
important categories, irrespective
of their current utility. Darwinian
evolutionary theory proposes
that the phenotype of a creature
is an adaptation to the particular
demands of the ecological
situation in which it evolved. To
this extent, a phenotype
displaying an animate monitoring
bias is thus reflecting implicit
information about the
environment in which it evolved.
The ability to preferentially
detect change in animate objects
allows humans to selectively
engage in behaviours that aid
survival when faced with those
objects.
This suggests that the ability to
detect change in animate objects
represents a heritable trait that
reflects implicit information about
the external structure of the
environment in which humans
evolved, an intriguing possibility.
But while intuitively appealing,
caution is required before
accepting such an argument.
Jerry Fodor [14] has recently
argued that phenotypes do not
always represent implicit
information about the
environment in which they
evolved. Instead, sometimes
phenotypes simply reflect
internal constraints on the
functional organisation of that
animal. For example, Fodor [14]
suggests that the reason pigs donot have wings is less to do with
the intrinsic structure of the
environment that pigs inhabit,
and more to do with the
fundamentals of how the pig
is constructed. The lack of wings
does not by itself carry any
intrinsic information about the
pig’s natural environment, and
has not been selected against
in the course of porcine
history!
Regardless of the precise
nature of the processes that have
shaped the anatomy and
functional specialisation of the
brain, these new findings provide
important insights into the
organisation of the human visual
system. Moreover, they
emphasise how consideration
of natural selection can potentially
inform discovery of the
psychological architecture
of human cognition [15].
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